Quetta
is burning again. In a surreal replay, we once again have men, women, children
killed brutally and gratuitously in the name of some demonic ideology. We once
again have hapless
Hazara families mourning and protesting and refusing to bury their dead.
And we once again have decent citizens, Shia and Sunni alike, protesting
countrywide yet another atrocity.
To
what end, one should ask.
Last
time we asked that the incompetent government of Aslam Raisani be removed. It
took the federal government some three days to concede that demand, rather
reluctantly and under pressure. The government also gave the Frontier Corps
policing powers. It was thought that the government had done both the necessary
and sufficient to ensure that the Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ) terrorists will slink
away.
Well
they haven’t. If anything, they have middle-fingered the government and the
entire decent population of Pakistan.
So,
what now? This time, the demand is to hand over Quetta to the army (there are
voices asking for much the same for Karachi). Pulling in
the army is no cure. The army neither has the capacity nor the required set
of skills to deal with this situation. It is stupid to try and kill flies with
a sledgehammer. The enemy in this case is both known and elusive.
Armies
like to pack a punch. But landing a punch requires a cheek. This enemy refuses
to present a target. He is cowardly; he lurks in the shadows; he sends in
suicide bombers, the ultimate smart bomb. And how will the army tackle that?
Let’s
take its standard MO. It will establish pickets; start patrolling; restrict
movement. But, for how long? This is not a riot situation and the army cannot
be given this task with no end in sight to that deployment.
The
LeJ is a terrorist group. It plans carefully and executes ruthlessly. It is not
out to capture territory physically. Its aim is to break the state’s will to
fight. Its plan requires psychological dominance. It instils fear; its use of
the suicide bomber is meant to tear asunder the social bonds and trust that are
the mainstay of the functioning of any society.
And
Quetta or Mastung are just two places where it operates. But what it is doing is
not to be seen in isolation. Its actions are part of the larger agenda of the
Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), allied with the remaining leadership of al
Qaeda in Pakistan’s tribal areas. With most of the Arab foot soldiers having
relocated to Yemen, Syria and Somalia, al Qaeda has found more fanatic cadres
from among the Punjabi Taliban.
Would
the state deploy the army everywhere, which is neither possible nor advisable?
While Quetta is mourning, up in Lahore, a Shia doctor and his 12-year-old son
were assassinated. This could be the beginning of a trend. The terrorist moves
swiftly and uses the element of surprise. He can strike, hunker down, and then
strike again. What made Hannibal win at the battles of Trebia, Lake Trasimene
and Cannae against much-larger Roman armies? Speed, deception, surprise.
The
TTP has put its agenda on the table, clearly and repeatedly. It knows the state
doesn’t have the will to fight. The political parties are in disarray over what
to do. The religio-political parties lie through their teeth. The state wants
to negotiate, but to what end? As noted by friend Feisal Naqvi, negotiations
presuppose give and take but the TTP has made it
amply clear that it only believes in taking.
One
should never shy from talking; very often a strategy relies on talking and
fighting. But knowing when to talk is crucial. Fear must never be the basis of
talking.
Let
it then be said — and I take a broad overview of the situation here, this being
no position paper — that deploying the army to fight ghost terrorists is no
answer. It will solve nothing. The strategy has to have many prongs.
Take
Quetta. It is sad that for long the city has been divided along ethnic lines.
But given this situation, concentration of population also makes it easier to
start by protecting Hazara areas. Designated army units should be on standby
but the lead has to be taken by the intelligence agencies. Flies can never be
swatted through brute force but with a deft hand. Actionable intelligence is
the most crucial ingredient of this fight. There should be better coordination
among different branches and between analysts and field operatives.
We
had ample time to develop efficient anti-terrorist units within the police but
that opportunity has been squandered. On the plus side, there’s still time to
begin to put such units together. The most important baseline is simple: action
has to be discriminate and effective. Home in on the flies; take them out with
a deft hand and at a time when they are least expecting it.
This
requires a set of skills and capability which is currently sorely lacking. Our
only response is to send in heavily armed units for fire-fighting. That is an
important part of a solution but not the primary one. The terrorists groups
send in groups of two or four. They manage, through a superior plan and
surprise, to engage hundreds of troops. The pattern has by now been repeated ad
nauseam. Sending in the troops hasn’t worked before and it won’t work next time
either.
Penetrate
the groups. Surprise them. Make them jittery. Take the initiative away from
them. Make them distrust each other. Force them into making mistakes.
All
of this is a function of superior intelligence and selective use of force, not
heavy contingents of army pooping off thousands of rounds of ammo in a fire
fight against two or four or six attackers after they have done the damage.
“All the terrorists were killed.” Big deal. What does it mean when the
objective for which they had come was achieved? And almost always, they come
with the knowledge that they will be killed. They have to be captured or killed
before they bring the war to us.
And
the army, if it’s still not clear enough, cannot do that.
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