Let
me make it simple: if you are a Shia in Pakistan, you are on your own. This
fact I state for the benefit of all those citizens of this country, Shia and
Sunni, who are grieving the slow demise of Mr Jinnah’s Pakistan and expecting
that the tide could be reversed through state action.
Now
for the longer answer.
There
is no doubt about who is killing the Shia. The Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ) has
repeatedly taken responsibility for it. Its captured terrorists have often stated
before courts that they have killed Shias and, given the opportunity, will do
it again. The identity of the killers is a settled issue.
Nota
Bene: The issue of the proxy war between Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states and
Iran, the funding to Sunni extremist groups and whatever is left of Shia
extremists, and circumstantial evidence of indirect involvement of hostile
agencies is important but peripheral to the main issue, i.e., the terrorists
are Pakistanis and killing on the basis of centuries-old denominational
differences. The current murderous spree, of course, has a modern political and
geopolitical context.
A
more relevant question is: if the group that is involved in these killings has
not only been ID-ed but IDs itself, what is stopping the state from acting
against it, and effectively?
This
is where the problem begins.
The
LeJ was begotten from the dark womb of the Sipah-e Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). The
SSP, banned by Pervez Musharraf, has reincarnated itself as the Ahle Sunnat Wal
Jamaat. It has a certain political presence. It is technically not the LeJ,
even as de facto it is. LeJ terrorists, along with the hardline splinter group
of Jaish-e Mohammad (JeM), have over the last five years, come to form the
backbone of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) conglomerate. The TTP is an
entity that political parties now — the ANP included (in desperation) — want to
talk to, even as the state considers the LeJ a terrorist entity.
So
while the LeJ is a terrorist organisation providing manpower to the TTP, the
state is being pressured to talk to the latter and give it the legitimacy of an
insurgent group.
But
this is not all. In Punjab, the ruling Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz is in talks
over seat adjustment with the ASWJ, the Dr Jekyll to its Edward Hyde, the LeJ.
Leaving aside the PML-N’s petty lying about the issue, it is a fact that it
wants to placate the LeJ through a dangerous liaison with the ASWJ. The general
impression is that this is being done to win votes. That’s only partially true.
The primary reason is that the PML-N doesn’t want mayhem in Punjab, its central
vote bank, where it wants to win and win big through a lot of development work
(even if lopsided) by Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif.
The
Faustian bargain is meant to keep the LeJ, and by extension the TTP, at bay. In
other words, the PML-N is doing this for the same reasons that the ANP wants to
talk to the TTP. The problem with this short-term approach is just that: it is
short term and allows these groups the respite and the space to strengthen
themselves and emerge as even more potent contenders against the state.
What
about the army and the ISI; how do they look at this phenomenon?
Short
answer: they are greatly worried. Next question: what are they doing about it?
Short
answer: not much.
Central
question: why the hell not? This requires a longer answer and some perspective.
Fact
1: The total strength of the army is about 550,000 troops. Out of this, around
110,000 are deployed in the operational areas in the west. Approximately 60,000
to 70,000 are deployed along the Line of Control as part of 10 Corps and Force
Command Northern Areas. The rest are in peacetime locations, to be mobilised to
defend the eastern border when required. Additionally, there are a number of
other command and staff duties to be performed.
Fact
2: Armies generally operate on the 33.33 per cent principle. At any time, 33.33
per cent are deployed, the same percentage is in training and equal numbers,
more or less, are resting and retrofitting. Pakistan’s internal war has thrown
this awry. The deployment has gone up to 44 to 45 per cent, training retains
the same percentage and the resting and retrofitting has gone down to about 12
percent. The ops areas tenure has upped from 22 months to over two years and a
high percentage of units are now awaiting second and third rotation to the ops
areas. Evidently a killer.
Fact
3: The Pakistan Military Academy has had to raise the 4th Pak Battalion because
the internal war has taken a heavy toll of young officers. The
officer-to-soldier kill ratio is very high, upped from 1:16 to 1:14 and now
stands at 1:8. This means a shortage of YOs. (Some officers consider it a
matter of pride; I consider it a weakness but that’s a separate topic.)
Corollary:
the army is stretched thin. It cannot be everywhere and, quite apart from
operations to wrest territory, is not meant to address the problem of urban
terrorism. Even the counterterrorism sub-units in the Special Services Group,
like the Zarar and Karar companies, are meant for fire-fighting, not gathering
intelligence and pre-empting.
And
the ISI? It has the capacity to gather intel and it does. But equally, there
are other organisations like the police, the Intelligence Bureau and the CID
units whose primary job is to gather intel. Why are they not effective? Answer:
when political governments make alliances with the very terrorists these
organisations are supposed to bust, then they cannot be effective. There are
other reasons too but this is the primary one.
And
when Frontier Corps does get involved, sending terrorists to their afterlife,
as in Quetta, the leaders of these organisations invoke the law and register
cases against the FC. Recently, the new Inspector General Police (IG)
Balochistan met with LeJ leaders and defended this by saying the police have to
reach out to them.
The
question is: if the LeJ is a banned terrorist organisation, how are these
leaders at large and meeting the IG?
The
confusion gets confounded. More on this next time.
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