There is no quick fix for Karachi’s problems but a
beginning has to be made, now
Karachi is yet again on fire and the
events have happened in quick succession. Unfortunately, this is not happening
for the first time in Karachi’s
sad history. The violence of the 1990s is widely attributed to General Ziaul
Haq’s policy of divide and rule. The echo of accusations against MQM (then
Mohajir Qaumi Movement) that it was being supported by General Zia’s
dictatorial regime to counter the PPP and other Sindhi nationalist groups,
keeps on revisiting us.
Even
today, many think that the level of peace in Karachi is directly proportional to MQM’s
share in the power pie. In other words, any challenge to MQM’s power claim can
leave Karachi
blood-stained. This theory is quite powerful but again falls short in telling
the whole truth.
I keep on
writing that perceived individual deprivation and marginalisation, when it gets
a collective identity — be it ethnic, political, sectarian or any other —
immediately creates two distinct groups: a group of victims who are being
oppressed and a group of oppressors.
In
societies with ample resources of livelihoods, such as democratic values,
sufficient fiscal cushion for social safety nets, and minimum standards of good
governance, the basic needs of everyone are met to some extent. In such
societies the deprived and privileged classes may mutually co-exist without
violent conflicts. However, in a situation where resources are scarce,
democracy becomes non-functional; state is lacking fiscal cushion to provide
social protection and there is no concept of good governance or rule of law.
In such a
situation, a collective identity to individual deprivations would immediately
lead to a class conflict that may turn violent at any time. The current
violence in Karachi
is a living example of this. The unprecedented violence has got ethnic,
political, sectarian and criminal reasons.
Karachi is ethnically diverse but still a
major hub of native Urdu-speaking people. The competition for scarce resources
between Urdu-speaking population and Sindhi-speaking, between Urdu-speaking and
Pakhtoon population, and between Urdu-speaking and Baloch is a reality. The
conflict between perceived marginalised and perceived oppressors has turned
violent and is one of the major causes of recent “tit for tat” target killings.
Karachi is also held hostage by the
political conflict — MQM versus MQM Haqeeqi, MQM versus PPP, ANP versus MQM;
and the love-hate relationship between MQM and PML-N. These have turned the
situation extremely volatile.
The power
struggle is geared to not only monopolise the scarce resource-base of Karachi
but also to control the administrative and law-enforcement machinery (through
political postings and transfers) that would help in gaining access to those
resources.
No wonder,
in order to protect the interests of their constituents, MQM has to remain part
of the ruling alliances be it with PML-N, as “B” team of a dictator, or with
PPP. By virtue of its access to power corridors, MQM has managed to put an
unwritten ban on creation of new political parties in Karachi.
MQM-Haqeeqi
tried to emerge as an independent political group and the result was violence
and target killings. Pakhtoons were welcomed in Karachi as long as they remained economic
immigrants. However, their emergence as political power under the auspice of
ANP led to violence and target killings between MQM and ANP.
The PPP
and MQM’s marriage of convenience seemed to work in the beginning but when PPP
started interfering in transfers and postings in Karachi and when PPP’s People’s Aman
Committee started challenging the street power of MQM, the result was bloodshed
and violence.
A deeper
analysis reveals that the existing political set-up in Karachi is not only
intolerant to creation of new political parties but it is also intolerant to
any non-political player who has the potential to change the existing voting
pattern divided along loyalties to MQM, PPP, ANP and other smaller but
established players such as PML-F and PML-N.
This is
where the conflict and violence takes a sectarian twist. Killings of leaders of
Sunni Ittehad and those of Dawat-e-Islami reflect sectarian root causes of
violence. Attacks on Edhi establishments and its ambulances, though not
sectarian in nature, highlight intolerance of existing power brokers towards
emerging group that has the potential to challenge their political hegemony.
The
struggle for control of power in Karachi
did not remain confined to ballot boxes. Most of these political parties draw
their power and resources from non-political and criminal gangs involved in
drug trading, land grabbing and extortions. There are areas and zones divided
among gangsters. Any encroachment in their territory by an opponent group leads
to bloodshed and violence.
Even if
these gangs are not being run by politicians, the latter do provide patronage
and support to individual gang members belonging to their respective parties.
Evidence produced by Zulfiqar Mirza against MQM, MQM’s diatribe against
People’s Aman Committee, and tit for tat allegations of MQM and ANP against
each other reveal that all three major players in this arena have some role to
play in supporting and fostering criminal gangs that are threatening the very
fabric of Karachi.
There are
also talks about involvement of either foreign (CIA, RAW) or/and domestic spy
agencies in flaring up recent violence in Karachi.
However, I am not very convinced of these theories (at least in the context of
current crisis). The power seekers in Karachi
are already self-sufficient in mutual destruction and don’t depend on
provocation from any agency to put their city amid the flames.
The fact
that Karachi is
threatened by multi-faceted violence necessitates multi-faceted solutions too. Karachi requires short,
medium and long term measures and all of those measures should be implemented
simultaneously without wasting more time.
An
over-simplistic solution like asking the army to restore peace in Karachi would never work
in the medium to long term. Army or rangers may help in curbing gangsters and
their activities but that would simply mask the symptoms which may reappear
once the army hands over Karachi’s
control to civilian agencies. One needs to wait and see the real impact of
current surgical operations by rangers. However, these operations should be
backed up by some medium and long term measures too.
One should
remember that army is not meant to clean the mess created by flawed political
decisions. The political forces should adapt to a genuine political process to
rectify the consequences of their short-sightedness. Dialogue with a view to
understand each other’s point of view; a resolve not to support and patronise
criminals and not to politicise the police and provincial bureaucracy; tolerance
towards emerging political groups; and a political will to provide space to
local leadership through local government elections are some of the steps that
political forces should take to save Karachi in the long term.
De-politicisation
of Karachi police
in particular and provincial bureaucracy in general is a must. Merit-based
postings and transfers of officials should help achieving this objective. These
institutions need to be reformed to remove the perceptions of social exclusion
and marginalisation among diverse groups present in Karachi.
The best
way to de-politicise these institutions is through providing an assurance to
public servants that their lives and jobs would not be at stake for following
the rules and procedures. This assurance should come from the top leadership of
all the political forces who have a claim in Karachi’s power corridors. This leadership
should understand that prevailed violence in Karachi may be the last nail in the coffin
and the whole democratic set-up may get wrapped up if they did not show
political maturity.
Another
most important measure that would ensure durable peace is de-weaponisation of
society. In short term, de-weaponisation would entail confiscating all weapons
being used against innocent people. However, long term de-weaponisation would
mean demilitarisation of our minds and attitudes so that we may strive for a
society completely free from torture, violence and weapons.
A durable
solution to Karachi
crisis lies in formulating and implementing policies and procedures that may
reduce individual deprivations and marginalisation and, in turn, promote social
justice.
The writer
heads Sustainable Development Policy Institute and can be contacted at
suleri@sdpi.org
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