TODAY,
Pakistan’s energy security stands compromised and the country is looking
towards the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline as a potential solution.
Given
the intricacies involved in this particular project, however, it would be
useful to dwell upon the blunders that have led us to this juncture. One of
these was the shelving of the Kalabagh dam project.
Over the years, there has been a substantial increase in the consumption in
Pakistan of gas, a locally available energy resource.
The shelving of the construction of Kalabagh dam led to renewed interest in
exploring gas as a power resource.
The discovery of additional gas reserves fuelled the unrestrained exploitation
of the resource towards the generation of energy.
The disproportionate dependency on gas skewed Pakistan’s energy mix, and led to
insignificant focus on harnessing other sources of energy, especially renewable
energy. Meanwhile, burgeoning energy consumption aggravated the depletion of
gas reserves.
Initially, gas was considered a feasible resource because of the low costs
involved in using it to generate power. It was believed that, given the vast
reserves in the country, gas would contribute effectively to Pakistan’s
economic growth.
However, the decision to rely on gas did not take into account the nature of
future consumption patterns and the fact that this natural resource is finite.
Focus on other energy sources took a backseat, particularly power generation
from hydroelectric schemes. In hindsight, it is clear that had different
decisions been made then, it would have helped avert the gas crisis Pakistan is
facing today.
Had Kalabagh dam been constructed, the total annual production would now have
been around 11,400 gigawatt hours (GWh).
But since the dam project was never initiated, the power that it could have
generated was instead generated from local gas reserves. The dam would not only
have saved the costs of electricity generation but would also have dispersed
monetary losses incurred due to the present gas shortfall.
Had Kalabagh dam became operational in 1993, 2737bn cubic feet (cft) of gas
would have been preserved. Between 1993 and 1999, a saving of 2.7tr cft from a
consumption of 10.9tr cft would have been made, which is about 24.77 per cent
of the total amount of gas consumed during the period.
Gas is used extensively as fuel in a number of sectors. In 2008-9, it was
mainly being used for power generation (32 per cent), industry (26 per cent),
household consumption (17 per cent), the production of fertiliser (16 per cent)
and compressed natural gas or CNG (seven per cent). The consumption of gas in
the power sector has been around 40 per cent since 1995, which started
decreasing in 2006. The share of the consumption of gas in CNG in the 2010-12 period
was around nine per cent but an annual increase of around 23 per cent has been
observed.
The country could therefore have made tremendous savings in gas. Had natural
gas been used for solely domestic purposes, the period of gas supply could have
been extended. The repercussions of the gas shortfall have been many, from
business losses incurred by CNG stations to rising socio-political unrest. A
timely decision in favour of hydropower development would have saved the
country from the energy crisis it is facing today.
Kalabagh dam would have guaranteed the continued supply of gas to the domestic
and transport sectors by 12.78 and 31 years respectively. There is no rationale
behind opting for gas as an energy source, given that the cost of generation is
high and it can in the long term become unaffordable. Kalabagh dam could have
saved Rs76.8bn if the energy produced had solely been used to generate
electricity. In addition, the share of oil in the energy generation mix is 32.3
per cent, which again costs more. If hydropower had been used to replace oil,
Rs124.5bn could have been saved.
Heavy dependency on natural gas has also contributed substantially to
Pakistan’s circular debt conundrum. This issue has debilitated the Water and
Power Development Authority (Wapda), resulting in long power outages which have
tremendous ramifications for the industrial sector in particular.
No significant expansion of the national grid to remote rural areas has been
possible either, which has kept large swathes of the population deprived of
energy. Meanwhile, gas shortages have aggravated the miseries of the common
man, and there is no relief in sight. Indeed, the gas shortage is currently one
of the greatest impediments to the country’s development. In addition
to the heavy financial losses being incurred, gas shortfalls have caused the
termination of jobs which has increased the level of unemployment in the
country.
Of course, Kalabagh dam on its own would not have averted the present crisis,
which had been imminent in any case. Yet it would have to a great extent
delayed the onset of the crisis. Pakistan’s power planners should have
recognised the benefits of hydropower projects; the investment of time and
effort on that would perhaps have prevented a gas crisis of this scale.
In light of the gas shortfall and the high exploitation of reserves for the
generation of power, the government must rapidly undertake a number of measures
that would help to not just reduce reliance on a finite energy resource but
also help build a national consensus on Kalabagh dam.
These include the installation of telemeter systems on rivers to ensure
transparent water management, expanded investment in the hydropower domain and
renewed commitments to increasing the share of hydroelectricity in the energy
generation mix.
The timely implementation of hydropower projects is needed, as well as the
financing of renewable energy and hydropower
projects and the enhanced use of renewable energy.
The writer
is an adviser to the Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad.
abbasi@sdpi.org
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