The Nato supply
lines have been reopened
but the fundamentals of US-Pakistan relations have not changed. That may
not stop the two sides from trying to make it work, though. In fact, knowing
that there are major divergences, but also that working together is important,
there is reason for both to apply themselves to the task of keeping this
transactional relationship afloat.
In Pakistan, for
that to happen, we must first define this relationship and identify US
objectives.
Easier said. We
still haven’t figured out whether the US is a friend and ally, a frenemy, or an
enemy. For
the Right it is an enemy; for the Left-Libs it is a friend.
Unfortunately,
these positions analyse US policies through ideological prisms. They also
indicate the internal fissures in Pakistan and are a poor tool for analysis
that requires the appreciation of a state’s policies in terms of multiple
factors, not just one — or ideological.
Take an example
from the Left-Lib position: the US is trying to fight extremism that also
threatens Pakistan, has helped Pakistan and Pakistani military with funds and
must, therefore, be seen as a friend. This linear argument — incidentally
derived from the US narrative — presents the US as a state that is out to
create much good in the world by eradicating the bad guys.
But the US is not
altruistic. It is a power that wants to secure the world system it created
post-World War II against any challenges to the system as well as to its role
as a world leader. It will do that through chaos or through aid, whichever
suits the purpose at whichever moment. Very often, it would do both.
So, it will give
funds to Pakistan but also put in place a spy network. It will help
in the energy and other sectors but also pursue policies that could ramp up
violence and get more Pakistanis killed. The objective is to secure America,
whatever it takes. The cost for Pakistan — or for any other country — doesn’t
matter. It would matter only if it also increased the cost for the US. No
grudging this because this is how states operate.
There are two
theories about US intentions vis-a-vis Pakistan. One posits that actions
leading to instability in Pakistan are not in the interest of Washington. The
other argues that a strong, unified Pakistan is not in the US interest.
The proponents of
the first question the rationality of a course of action which, as they argue,
could unleash many unintended consequences. The second school argues that
because Pakistan’s strategic interests in the region conflict with the US’ and
also with India’s, and because the US is also planning a future conflict with
China, which cannot be a direct one, the stability-instability paradox
necessitates proxy wars and the battleground will be Af-Pak and, increasingly,
Pakistan itself.
From emerging
evidence, the second school cannot be outright discounted. The rational choice
approach of the first school can also be challenged by asking the proponents to
define the optimal choice(s) of the US in the region and in relation to
Pakistan. It is not enough to say that the US is playing the game for peace and
stability and that is the optimal choice because very often the endgame in and
of itself does not determine the course of action. In other words, if state X
is playing for peace, it is neither necessary nor inevitable that it would use
approaches that are also peaceful. Neither can peace itself define peace. Would
the US consider a strong, stable Pakistan as a necessary and sufficient
condition for peace? What if that is not the case, especially if a strong
Pakistan were not aligned with its interests in the region?
This would then
require playing a more complex game where, while outcomes become more
unpredictable, their unpredictability is seen to outweigh the high stakes
involved and the dividends to be reaped. Let’s put it in another way: what
would be the ideal scenario for the US — a strong, stable Pakistan with nuclear
weapons or a Pakistan sans nuclear weapons and subsumed in the larger US scheme
for the region?
Understanding the
game would also require defining US interests. What are they? If it’s only
about peace in Afghanistan, then the US should be pursuing the talks track with
the Taliban more seriously than has been the case so far. Does the coterie that
rules Kabul have any
interest in talking to Pakistan or settling the issues with the Taliban? So
far, it is clear that it is in the interest of the Kabul cabal to consolidate
the system that keeps it in power. And that means two things: continued
military and economic support by the US and US presence in Afghanistan.
Threat perception
is not a fixed notion and depends on unfolding situations. In theory, if at
point X, Pakistan feels that in situation Y the level of threat from the US
stands at nine on a scale of 1-10, at point A and in situation B it could drop
to two. A simple benchmark is the capability-intention framework. States employ
it to determine threats and identify counter-measures, not just immediate but
also distant, not just possible but also probable. Capability is important
because intentions can undergo a change, depending on situations and interests.
Add to it the fact
that threat analysis is not an exercise in linearity and we have a situation
where, while
the US is not a friend, we need to work to ensure that it doesn’t become an
enemy either. To this end, we have to devise direct and indirect policies
that increase our strategic options in the region. We also have to ensure the
writ of the state internally in order to be able to advance the sovereignty
argument more effectively. But to do all this we have to go heavy on strategy,
not tactics. Can we?
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