In
an 1,856-word editorial in its October 13 issue, the New York Times has declared that Afghanistan is not a war of
necessity and “it is time for United States forces to leave Afghanistan
[because]… the United States will not achieve even President Obama’s narrowing
goals, and prolonging the war will only do more harm.”
It
is good to know that the mainstream media outlets in the US are coming around
to appreciating the situation rather than continuing to situate the
appreciation.
Back
in December 2009, President Barack Obama had spoken at West Point, outlining
his Afghanistan policy after a major review process. He talked about his
“overarching” goal of making efforts “to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al
Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten
America and our allies in the future”.
His
policy: pursue a military strategy that will break the Taliban’s momentum and
increase Afghanistan’s capacity over the next 18 months — i.e., additional
troops; work with partners, the United Nations and the Afghan people to pursue
a more effective civilian strategy, so that the government can take advantage
of improved security; act with the full recognition that US success in
Afghanistan is inextricably
linked to its partnership with Pakistan. This relates to strategically
partnering Pakistan, with emphasis both on the civilian and military side of
it.
In
sum, as President Obama put it, “These are the three core elements of our
strategy: a military effort to create the conditions for a transition; a
civilian surge that reinforces positive action; and an effective partnership
with Pakistan”.
President
Obama failed in achieving all these objectives. The military effort, despite
operations in Helmand and Kandahar, as well as night raids, tactically
effective, did not add any significant strategic value to the US policy because
it could not, in and of itself, improve governance. Governance never improved
for a host of reasons that range from institutional problems to corruption in
Afghanistan and the UN system to structural and security problems to confusion
over how to design such interventions, etc.
The
foreign governments involved with and in the larger US project in Afghanistan
failed to understand that the central government in Kabul always had a very
tenuous relationship with the Afghan countryside inhabited by multiple
solidarity groups. Kabul dealt with them through negotiations whose rules were
honed over scores. Those rules constrained space for both sides, for the
central government as well as the tribes. This is a system that can be changed
only from within. The Soviets sent troops to help the communists reengineer
Afghanistan. The project failed. The free world’s project had a better chance
at success if the Americans
did not spurn Taliban overtures in 2004 to negotiate a safe return but that
is one of history’s if-onlys.
Most
analysts believe a US withdrawal without stabilising Afghanistan will plunge
the country into a civil war. There are three problems with this argument: one,
the US presence itself is contributing to instability; two, the US is in no
position to stabilise Afghanistan; three, whether the US leaves in a year, two
years or five, Afghanistan will see another round of civil war. The longer the
US stays the greater the intensity of the next round.
Interestingly,
while the NYT
supports full withdrawal, the Obama Administration wants to retain American
troops — 15,000-20,000 — on five bases in Afghanistan. That hasn’t happened so
far but highly-placed Afghan sources concede the pressure is immense and Kabul
might have to give at least three bases, two to the US military and one,
nominally, to Nato.
The
Pashtuns in the Karzai government are not too enamoured of this but Kabul’s
broader ruling clique has many elements that do not want the US to leave and a
minority remains completely opposed to any dialogue with the Taliban. These
elements want the US to retain military presence and they also want the monies
to keep coming in. Afghanistan’s civil society and its women, mostly urban
based, are also either opposed to, or greatly afraid of, a scenario in which
the Taliban can make a full or partial return.
President
Hamid Karzai realises that the Taliban cannot be defeated. He wants a quick reconciliation
with them and wants Islamabad to facilitate the process. Islamabad wants to
help Kabul but is also wary of President Karzai’s mood swings. The Afghan
president continues to oscillate between the two extremes of calling Pakistan a
special friend and declaring it an adversary, much to the chagrin even of those
Afghan officials who are supposed to work with Pakistan at multiple levels and
who, it must be said, have done much good work over the past year.
For
Pakistan, the situation throws up many challenges. An unstable Afghanistan
doesn’t help Pakistan fight its war in Fata, a war it has to fight and conclude
by destroying the terrorist groups that are attacking Pakistan.
The
US failure in Afghanistan means Pakistan has to deal with the Afghan Taliban
and ensure, in collaboration with Kabul, to pull them into the political
process and make them contest for the control of Afghanistan through
constitutional-political means rather than through force of arms.
To
this end, Pakistan will have to work closely with Afghanistan and fast-track
negotiations with the Taliban. The two envoys in Kabul and Islamabad,
Ambassadors Muhammad Sadiq of Pakistan and Mohammad Umer Daudzai of
Afghanistan, are arguably best suited to help the two sides come together meaningfully.
This assessment is not a hope but based on work done by them over the past
year.
The
situation has its own urgency for Pakistan quite apart from what the American
endgame might be. We have our own war to fight and conclude in Fata and other
parts of Pakistan. That fight is not just over territory but also opposing
ideologies and value systems. Pakistan
needs a stable Afghanistan in order to be able to fight its internal war.
Pakistan’s
current policy of normalising relations with all the neighbours and beyond is
not just good foreign policy but is also incredibly important for addressing
its internal threat.
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