Let’s
get the baseline straight. Pakistan and India cannot afford
a hot conflict. Anyone who thinks or advocates otherwise is either stupid
or dishonest.
In
Pakistan, we have a politico-military consensus on the following: we face an
internal threat which also has linkages, at some levels, with external threats
and we have to deal with it; we need zero conflict in the region; we have to
normalise and develop meaningful relations with all the neighbours in and
beyond the region; we have to focus on economic and social development.
This
paradigm requires that we deal with India and Afghanistan, improving and
normalising relations with both and expanding outwards to other states. The
concept is necessitated by geography and demands that we leverage our placement
on the map. For years we have talked about our strategic location. For years we
have squandered the opportunities it offers us, turning it into a liability
rather than using it as an asset.
Our
location demands that we open up to the world; integration, not isolation, must
be the thrust. If we are the strategic bridge then it should be clear that
bridges work best when they link. They are useless when they don’t.
This
is the straight line on the graph. In the real world there are always swings on
the ideal line. That brings me to the recent, orchestrated flare-up in India
against Pakistan. My use of ‘orchestrated’ is considered. So here goes.
It
will be instructive for a researcher to rewind to the first day when news came
about an Indian raid across the Line of Control (LoC) at Haji Pir and then play
forward what happened after that in India. This exercise will establish that
while the Indian government did not react to the story in the opening phase,
the Indian media and the Indian Army began to set the tone for Delhi and
pressured the United Progressive Alliance government. In Pakistan, for days,
initially, the media had no clue about what was going on.
Play
out it did and while the Haji Pir aggression was pushed in the background, we
got stories about what Pakistan had done by allegedly sneaking in a team to
kill two Indian soldiers, one of whom was ‘beheaded’. Using classic propaganda
techniques, the Indian media reduced the issue to the alleged beheading sans
any reference to what had earlier happened and the fact that India has been
violating the ceasefire agreement at places since last year. TV screens flared
up. The Hindu right wing demanded Armageddon. Sane voices in the print were
ignored, easy to do that because when it comes to Pakistan, there are very few
sane voices in India to begin with.
The
government of Dr Manmohan Singh, a walking corpse now, under pressure
domestically for several reasons, buckled under. Dr Singh declared it was not
business as usual; the normalisation process was hit; Pakistani hockey players
were asked to leave; the same happened to Pakistani singers and showbiz people,
etcetera. The details are available. Singh has since tried to feebly control
damage but he is hardly in control.
Why
did this happen? Firstly, unlike Pakistan, there is no real political consensus
in India on normalising with Pakistan. Regardless of Pakistan’s concessions,
and Pakistan has conceded almost everything India has demanded over the years —
trade, investment, MFN without reference to disputes — India demands, though it
won’t say so for obvious reasons, unconditional capitulation from Pakistan.
Secondly,
India is conscious of, and worried about, Pakistan’s new foreign policy
initiatives. For years, but more recently since Kargil, India had relied on
painting Pakistan as a belligerent state, responsible for hers and South Asia’s
woes. Pakistan’s aggressive diplomacy towards eradicating conflict runs totally
contrary to how India wants to present Pakistan to score diplomatic points.
Linked to this is the situation in Indian-Occupied Kashmir. In the 90s, India
could move the issue away from its oppression of Kashmiris — which continues —
to presenting it to the world as a terrorism problem. What to do now? Hot up
the LoC, start crying infiltration to cover up its violations of the Line and
blame Pakistan.
Thirdly,
India is not very happy with Pakistan regaining its position in Afghanistan
vis-a-vis the United States as well as the current Kabul government. New Delhi
is also concerned about its influence and investment in Afghanistan post-2014.
Neither was entirely benign. It helps to try and put Pakistan back in the
doghouse.
Fourthly,
it is interesting to note how the Indian military, in combination with the
media, got into the play. Quite apart from the fact that it makes interesting
study to note the Indian military’s rising influence over the years in
policymaking — a point I have been making for several years now — the
aggression shown first by the Indian Chief of Air Staff (CAS) and then by the
COAS have other reasons.
India’s
growth rate has gone down; it will fall further. The Indian military budget —
maintenance and development — has been growing exponentially. Deeper pockets
had allowed the Indian military to move from the labour-intensive to the
capital-intensive model. That is under threat now.
There
are acquisitions in the pipeline. With pockets shrinking, sceptics in India
will question some spending and might even ask to slash some programmes.
Militaries hate that. They need an excuse to defend allocations. For the Indian
CAS, the Rafale fighter acquisition is crucial, which is why he chose to speak
up on a minor tactical issue concerning ground forces at the LoC. [NB: Check
facts on India’s military imports and modernisation from SIPRI, IISS and
Jane’s.]
In
an ironic way, India’s worry is a salute to Pakistan’s new policy, steered by
the Foreign Office under the able guidance of Pakistan’s young foreign
minister. That’s a separate topic to which we shall return another time. But
here, it is important to note that despite India’s provocative behaviour,
Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar has continued
to keep her humour and the policy Pakistan has decided to pursue. This is
precisely what the Pakistani media must do as well while countering the Indian
propaganda. Equally, India must realise that full normalisation is a function
of dispute resolution and engagement is not spelled ‘appeasement’, thank you.
|
